Naroditskiy, Victor and Steinberg, Richard (2015) Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution. Games and Economic Behavior, 93. pp. 24-41. ISSN 0899-8256
|
PDF
- Accepted Version
Download (508kB) | Preview |
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.010
Abstract
It is well-known that efficient use of congestible resources can be achieved via marginal pricing; however, payments collected from the agents generate a budget surplus, which reduces social welfare. We show that an asymptotically first-best solution in the number of agents can be achieved by the appropriate redistribution of the budget surplus back to the agents.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/08998... |
| Additional Information: | © 2015 Elsevier Inc. |
| Divisions: | LSE |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions Q Science > QA Mathematics |
| JEL classification: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
| Date Deposited: | 20 Jul 2015 11:11 |
| Last Modified: | 20 Sep 2025 01:04 |
| URI: | http://eprintstest.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/62771 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
